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The adoption of the euro is a crucial turning point for the economy of any EU member and the 
culmination of a long process of exchange rate management and macroeconomic convergence. 
But how does the prospect of euro area enlargement play out in the countries that have already 
adopted the euro? Are new members seen as a way to expand the club of like-minded countries, 
or are they perceived as a threat to stability, either because there exists a moral hazard risk from 
the side of old members to adopt riskier behavior on behalf of new members or vice versa? This 
paper looks at the effects of the news of the euro’s adoption event in new members on the stock 
returns of nineteen euro area countries, employing both an event study methodology and 
APARCH modeling to capture and test the form of responses of European financial market 
volatility. Our results show that markets were indeed pleased when new members joined the euro 
area, with negative responses due solely to local conditions rather than euro area-wide travails. 
In our most interesting finding, the expansion of the euro actually helped to dampen local market 
volatility in the post-crisis period in the founding member states, while euro adoption quelled 
volatility both pre- and post-crisis for non-founding members. 
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The introduction of the euro is the biggest step that a European Union Member State can take 
towards economic integration with its fellow members. The benefits of euro accession and why a 
country would wish to accede have been well-explored in the literature, including the lowering of 
transaction costs due to a common currency (Hurník, et al., 2010), a reality which should improve 
overall firm performance (especially for exporters). Involvement in the single currency should also 
help to increase competitiveness through price transparency (Ottaviano, et al., 2009), while the 
euro’s presence should help to drive macroeconomic convergence and reduce the “volatility of 
macroeconomic fundamentals of the historically unstable European economies” (Morana & 
Beltratti, 2002, p. 2048). Additionally, other authors have conjectured that the euro would improve 
allocative efficiency and provide more space for risk-sharing (Sørensen & Yosha, 1998). Finally, as 
stock returns in a currency union should be dependent on expectations regarding future returns, 
interest rates, and risk premiums (Bekaert, et al., 2013), euro adoption should also presumably feed 
into lower stock volatility (Kim, et al., 2015).  
These positive effects have been mooted almost solely for the country that is acceding to the 
euro area (EA), however, leaving little evidence on how existing members would view the expansion 
of the single currency zone. This is an important point, as the incentives of existing euro area 
members are to jealously guard the macroeconomic stability of the union and not allow new 
members who may upset that balance. Put another way, with monetary policy being outsourced and 
if the benefits of the euro include lowered transaction costs and dampened volatility, there is a 
massive incentive to only admit members who will continue these conditions.  
Unfortunately, as the events in Greece from 2009 onward have shown, there is a measure of 
asymmetric information regarding those joining the euro area, as it is not always easy to distinguish 
which countries will help maintain stability and who can potentially be problematic for the conduct 
of monetary policy. In such a situation, European capital markets, and especially those in existing 
euro area states, have a role to play in transmitting information on the desirability of the next addition 
to the currency area (as suggested in Bhanot, et al. [2014] and Avalos [2016]).  
The valuable nature of this informational effect can be attributed to the fact that the actual 
introduction of the euro is the last step in a long journey of legislative and economic alignment with 
existing euro members, a journey beginning with behind-the-scenes negotiations and continuing 
through a public announcement of a country’s planned accession and internal political debates 
approving the move (Pechova, 2012). As this process continues, markets may express their 
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judgments via volatility effects and negative returns surrounding both the announcement of a new 
member and the actual accession of that country to the currency union (Bartram & Karolyi, 2006). 
Moreover, these judgments may not be static but rather conditional on the timing of the introduction 
of the currency (Bris, et al., 2008). In particular, prevailing economic conditions in EA countries 
could have a sizeable impact on EA stock markets, with favorable economic conditions likely to 
induce markets to see additional euro area countries more positively and poor conditions (i.e. a 
financial crisis) creating much more uncertainty. 
Despite this firm theoretical grounding, there is a noticeable gap regarding the effects of the 
introduction of the euro in the extant literature on the aggregate response of financial markets of 
existing Member States. Indeed, the focus of the existing research on the euro’s introduction is mainly 
concerned with financial convergence and linkages after the euro has been adopted (Bartram & 
Karolyi, 2006; Bartram, et al., 2007; Alexandrou, et al., 2011) or the how cross-country differences 
in industry composition affected the response of particular European economies (Bekaert, et al., 2007; 
Eiling, et al., 2012). The omission of the aggregate level effects is puzzling, as the macroeconomic 
“news effect” on stock returns and volatility at the market level has been extensively explored; 
indeed, this prior research provides a solid foundation for theorizing on the possible effects of an 
entire country’s market reactions to the expansion of the euro area. 
The purpose of this paper is to take up the challenge of Green & Bai (2008, p. 445) for “more 
detailed research on capital market impacts of the new currency” and fill the euro area-sized hole in 
the literature regarding the effects of euro adoption on financial markets. In particular, we are the first 
to our knowledge who examine if the adoption of the euro in new countries harmed or helped stock 
markets throughout the EA: we believe that accession to the euro would have been welcomed in the 
country which was acceding, but the effect on existing euro members would be conditional on the 
country that was joining. Furthermore, given the centrality of the euro crisis to public opinion on the 
viability of the common currency, we assert that responses pre-crisis would have been different than 
post-crisis, also conditioned on the size of the country and the general macroeconomic environment 
in the euro area.  
This research question is explored here using event study methodology (MacKinlay, 1997; 
Campbell, et al., 1997; Green & Bai, 2008) and a behavioral arbitrage pricing model (Lemmon & 
Portniaguina, 2006; Ho & Hung, 2009; Chandra & Thenmozhi, 2017) with asymmetric power-
ARCH (APARCH) effects (Ding, et al., 1993). Our results show that markets were indeed pleased 
when new members joined the euro area, with negative responses due solely to local conditions 
rather than euro area-wide travails. In our most interesting finding, the expansion of the euro actually 
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helped to dampen local market volatility in the post-crisis period in the founding member states, 
while euro adoption quelled volatility both pre- and post-crisis for non-founding members. Despite 
heterogeneity in responses, this result is robust to several behavioral and macroeconomic controls.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 explicitly formulates our research 
hypotheses in the context of the extant literature, while Section 3 describes the data and lays out an 
estimation strategy. Section 4 provides results and a discussion and Section 5 then concludes. 
 
2. Euro Adoption and Responses to Joining the Club 
As noted, the effects of euro adoption on the aggregate stock markets of both acceding and 
existing euro area countries have not been explicitly detailed in the literature. Only two notable 
exceptions stand out, with Green & Bai (2008) and Morana & Beltratti (2002) examining respectively 
the effects of the euro on stock market returns and volatility. Green & Bai’s (2008) work utilized 
event study methodology to capture the effects of euro adoption at its inception in January 1999 on 
EA stock markets. Considering the euro adoption as a market reform rather than a completely 
anticipated event, they report significant cumulative abnormal returns in both euro and non-euro 
European stock markets after the euro was introduced in all founding Member States. Interestingly, 
Green & Bai (2008) do not look at market volatility after the euro was actually adopted, a key theme 
which was explored instead in Morana & Beltratti (2002). Exploring the changes in market volatility 
in France, Germany, Spain, Italy, the UK, and the US following the euro introduction event, Morana 
and Beltratti found a brief burst of volatility but a longer-term significant reduction in volatility in 
the Italian and Spanish stock markets.  
With these papers the only previous empirical evidence on the effects of euro accession on capital 
markets, we must look elsewhere in order to tackle the question of how existing euro area markets 
react to news of new members. Indeed, our approach is to infer these effects from clues spread across 
three separate research strands in finance and economics: first, news effects and the linkages between 
capital market movement and macroeconomic news as typified in papers such as Mitchell & Mulherin 
(1994) and Hayo & Kutan (2005); second, spillover effects across capital markets as shown in a 
European context in recent work from Fedorova & Saleem (2010) and Caporale, et al. (2016); and 
finally, asymmetric responses to particular news items, conditioned on the type of news and the 
source (Veronesi, 1999; Boyd, et al., 2005). Amassing the lessons from this research, we have 
fashioned three hypotheses regarding how the adoption of the euro would impact both new and 
existing members after controlling for changes in the euro-area market’s returns as a whole. In reality, 
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we create an analog of previous firm-level analyses, by treating the corresponding stock market 
returns of both founding and non-founding EA member states as particular assets that display normal 
and abnormal behavior; the abnormal behavior of market-wide returns are then be used for the 
inference of hypotheses. 
H1: News of or the actual introduction of the euro has a beneficial effect on the returns and 
volatility of the stock market in the country which introduces the euro.  
Fundamentally, under the assumptions of efficient markets and identically informed investors 
behaving rationally, stock prices should depend on expected cash flows, the discount rate, and stock- 
or market-specific risk premium. This hypothesis takes this reality into account, theorizing that 
effects of joining the euro imply a rational response by financial markets to possible changes in the 
long-term value of the currency, lower inflation volatility (Mongelli & Wyplosz, 2008), greater 
earnings potential due to access to larger markets (Badinger & Breuss, 2009), and lower transaction 
costs (Hurník, et al., 2010). Moreover, the adoption of the euro may significantly change the business 
environment of the countries acceding to the common currency, making them more open for foreign 
investment; for smaller countries especially; acceding to the EA could have major benefits in terms 
of access to capital and help to dampen financial volatility via financial depth (Agénor, 2003). On 
the other hand, euro adoption may also increase exposure to other euro area markets, leading to an 
increase in volatility beyond that generated by domestic events (Billio & Pelizzon, 2003).  
We assume for this paper that the news of euro adoption should be greeted warmly by financial 
markets within the acceding country, leading to higher returns at both the announcement of the euro’s 
adoption and (lesser) at the actual adoption of the euro. Given the long lead-in process to euro 
adoption, it is anticipated that markets will price in the benefits of the euro before its introduction, 
but that the actual step in joining the club will occasion some abnormal returns for a time. In line with 
Morana & Beltratti (2002), we also assume that euro adoption will have a longer-term dampening 
effect on financial markets in the home country, mainly through a lowering of transaction costs 
(Bartram & Karolyi, 2006; Hau, 2006) and convergence in financial development (Kim, et al., 2005).  
H2: The effect of news or introduction of the euro within a country was a different pre-global 
financial crisis and post-crisis. 
The linkage between extant economic conditions and the stock market has a long pedigree in 
financial economics, going back to Chen, et al. (1986) and further advanced by Cutler, et al. (1989) 
and McQueen & Roley (1993). McQueen and Roley’s insights are the asymmetry of market 
responses to different types of news and how these responses are dependent upon the overall 
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economic environment. In particular, the authors concluded that good news related to real economic 
activity is generally damaging the stock market returns if overall economic conditions are already 
good. To put it another way, unanticipated hikes in economic activity in a weak economy may raise 
expectations about future economic activity and cash flows, but the same information in a strong 
economy does not necessarily lead to higher expected cash flows.   
Veronesi (1999) formalized this response in a model, which explicitly allowed variation in 
investor responses to dividend news in different states of the economy. If the tone of the 
macroeconomic news goes against current market directions, it generates a high level of investor 
uncertainty about the state of the market and its future direction, leading investors to discount the 
new information at a higher rate. However, this model also assumes a measure of asymmetry, as 
investors overreact to bad news in good times and underreact to good news in bad times. In good 
times, bad news produces high stock price volatility and higher uncertainty about a firm’s 
fundamentals, causing stock prices to fall further than the reduction in expected future returns that 
news may bring (overreaction). Whilst good news in bad times also produces a higher level of 
investor uncertainty on future cash flows (reflected in increased volatility of stock prices), dampening 
any upward adjustment in stock price and keeping such adjustments lower than the increase in 
expected cash flows (underreaction). This model is in line with psychological assessments of how 
people filter good and bad news differently (Baumeister, et al., 2001).  
Veronesi’s (1999) model has stood up well to empirical tests, with confirmation of his thesis to 
be found in the work of Flannery & Protopapadakis (2002), Adams, et al. (2004), and Boyd, et al. 
(2005), concerning the news on unemployment. Minor exceptions to this consensus exist: Docking 
& Koch (2005), in their investigation on the sensitivity of US investors’ reactions to dividend 
announcements under different market conditions, found that the congruence of recent market 
direction and volatility were statistically and economically significant for bad news in good markets, 
but not for good news (i.e. there was no evidence of underreaction, only overreaction). Similarly, 
Andersen, et al. (2007) explore asset price responses to the fundamental economic news in the U.S., 
German and British stock, bond and foreign exchange markets, finding symmetrical responses to bad 
news during expansions and good news in recessions. Brenner, et al. (2009) also find that positive 
surprises have a stronger impact on stock returns than negative surprises in the US market. However, 
despite these findings, more recent work by Knif, et al. (2008) concerning inflationary news, Birz & 
Lott (2011) on both GDP and unemployment news, and Garcia (2013) on all types of financial news 
during a recession have also confirmed the underlying precepts of the Veronesi (1999) model.  
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[Figure 1 here] 
In the euro area, it is anticipated that market reactions to new euro entrants followed a similar 
pattern as Veronesi’s model, with the breakpoint being the global financial crisis. A look at the data 
from the comparative experiences of Slovenia and Lithuania could help to illustrate these effects. 
Slovenia adopted the euro in 2007 (pre-crisis) to broad popular support within the country, with 
more than a third of Slovenian businesses expecting positive results (Eurobarometer, 2007). The 
Slovenian stock market was also welcoming, with low levels of volatility throughout 2006 in tandem 
with generally placid EA stock markets (Figure 1). Removing a spike in volatility six months after 
the adoption of the euro due to the country’s presidential elections, the remaining movement in the 
volatility of Slovenian log stock market returns closely follows movements in their new EA 
counterparts.  
[Figure 2 here] 
On the other hand, Lithuania joined the EA in 2015, immediately following a period of 
incredible turmoil surrounding Greece and its possible exit from the EA (turmoil that Lithuania 
seemed strangely impervious to, see Alexakis, et al. 2016). Moreover, during the run-up to the 
introduction of the euro, the Lithuanian public was considerably wary of the changeover, with only 
44% of respondents in a poll believing that the Euro would have positive consequences for the 
country (Eurobarometer, 2014; Eurobarometer, 2015). However, while the Lithuanian stock market 
was incredibly calm when the euro was actually introduced (Figure 2), the euro area exhibited high 
spikes in volatility around this event (with the largest jump in over a year seen immediately 
following the euro’s adoption). While other major macroeconomic news was occurring around the 
same time (in particular the Greek elections on January 25 and the initiation of the ECB’s version 
of quantitative easing), they were also related directly to the expansion of the euro area; such 
increased volatility was thus perhaps signaling that markets were not so sanguine about adding 
another, poorer country to the mix at a time of already-heightened uncertainty.1 Additionally, the 
time to joining the euro from the announcement of joining in Lithuania’s case was one of the shortest 
on record (July 23, 2014, to January 1, 2015) – perhaps a consequence of the earlier failed attempt 
to join the euro in 2007 (Markevičiūtė & Kuokštis, 2016) – meaning that euro area markets may not 
have had time to process the information (Eurobarometer, 2015). Given Lithuania’s long history of 
 
1 Indeed, the Greek election campaign was fought entirely on the question of a bailout from the EU and resulted in a 
victory for the anti-bailout forces. See Koliastasis (2015) for further details. 
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attempting to joining the euro-area and failing, it is likely that Lithuania finally fulfilling its 
accession criteria also may have been somewhat of a surprise (Backé & Dvorsky, 2018). 
Beyond this eyeballing of the data regarding two separate euro accession countries, there is also 
some econometric evidence to show state-dependence in how news is absorbed in the euro area. For 
example, Fernández-Rodríguez, et al. (2015), looking at transmission of volatility through the 
sovereign bond market of EA states, found that the peripheral EA countries (Italy, Spain, Portugal, 
and Ireland) triggered volatility spillovers throughout the EA but only after the global financial crisis 
(“core” EA countries were the source of spillovers before the crisis). Similarly, Koulakiotis, et al. 
(2016) also find strong volatility and error spillovers amongst the banking sectors in Germany, 
Greece, Ireland, Italy, and Spain concerning bad news emanating from Greece; more importantly, 
their findings were also contingent on the state of the economy, with volatility remaining more 
persistent and widespread after the Greek crisis than before. Given these results, we believe that the 
market response to euro adoption across the EA will be conditional not only on the country entering 
but on when a country enters as well. 
H3: Adoption of the euro by another country will have an asymmetric impact on the local stock 
market of existing euro members, dependent on which country is joining. 
Finally, Hypotheses 1 and 2 should be uncontroversial, given the large body of literature 
surrounding currency unions and positive macroeconomic news. However, in tandem with the 
domestic effect of euro introduction, as we noted above, there also should be effects occurring in the 
capital markets of countries that are integrated economically and financially with the country 
introducing the euro. Such effects have been explored in a sizeable and varied literature on the 
volatility spillover effects of macroeconomic news across large and integrated markets. Engle, et al. 
(1990) note that spillovers can be thought of as “heat waves” or “meteor showers:” under the “heat 
wave” hypothesis, higher volatility is seen as a local phenomenon, which does not spread from market 
to market in any sequential fashion, but a “meteor shower” would see higher volatility spills from 
one market to the next over the course of the global trading day. The evidence presented by Engle, et 
al. (1990) is that volatility spillovers tend to follow the “meteor shower” path, a result which has been 
replicated several times: for example, Connolly & Wang (1998) argue that macroeconomic news has 
little return spillover effect across the US, the UK, and Japan, but does have a significant effect on 
volatility spillovers across the three countries. In particular, they find that foreign news has a stronger 
impact on the volatility of the local market than local news. Nikkinen & Sahlström (2004) also find 
that US domestic announcements (employment reports) have a larger effect on European markets 
than in the US. More recently, Jiang, et al. (2012), considering the effects of European news on US 
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stock markets and vice versa, find comparable results, although they make a distinction regarding the 
volatility engendered by unscheduled announcements, which tends to be much higher than volatility 
accompanying scheduled announcements.2 Similarly, Kim, et al. (2015) discovered that bad news in 
the euro area increases volatility in the US and China, while bad news from the US had a 
paradoxically calming effect on euro area stock markets after the global financial crisis. 
Similar to the voluminous literature on spillover effects, there is a well-developed literature on 
asymmetric effects of news, with bad news assumed to have a much stronger effect on stock market 
returns and volatility than good news. There has been a veritable torrent of work confirming the 
volatility-creating effects of macroeconomic news in the past decade, with papers such as Nikkinen, 
et al. (2006), Brenner, et al. (2009), and Rangel (2011) showing how bad news tends to generate more 
volatility (in addition to poor returns) than good news, dependent upon country-specific traits. 
Moreover, the content of the news also has its own magnifying effect on responses: for example, 
Bomfim (2003) shows that if an announcement contains new information previously not incorporated 
in stock prices, the volatility of stock markets tends to increase in the short-run.  
In each of these cases, however, the volatility transmission of news occurred either within or 
across countries that had independent monetary policies, currencies, and financial markets. What of 
the case where monetary policies are integrated into a common currency, even though financial 
markets remain independent, as in the euro area? Kohonen (2013), echoing Connolly & Wang (1998), 
found that local macroeconomic news may be digested more accurately by local investors, but 
overlapping stock markets such as in the EA can help to increase the number of uninformed investors, 
thus exacerbating volatility and spillover in a crisis. Bhanot, et al. (2014) provide further empirical 
evidence, finding that negative news announcements regarding the Greek crisis have had significant 
spillover effects in other EA countries, with the Netherlands, Spain, and Portugal seeing substantial 
increases in financial volatility.  
This wealth of research begs the question, however, is either the introduction of the euro or its 
expansion good news or bad news? Our conjectured answer to this question is it depends, mainly on 
which country is joining. Our hypothesis here asserts that spillover effects, coinciding with news 
events, should be highly country-dependent (and thus asymmetric), as a country with perceived 
excellent macroeconomic fundamentals and stability is likely to be welcomed by financial markets 
of existing euro Member States, while unstable or “bad” candidates could generate higher levels of 
financial volatility. Markets already do a good job of differentiating amongst the EA Member States 
 
2 Their results are in line with an ex-ante updating of expectations by market participants as the reaction to the anticipated 
shocks, while unanticipated news implies overreactions reflected in volatility hikes. 
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concerning their relative risk (Ribeiro, et al., 2017), so it is plausible to assume that acceding EA 
members would also be under the same scrutiny by stock markets. We thus anticipate that a host of 
country characteristics (detailed below) would help markets to make such a judgment. 
While our paper would be the first to explicitly model this relationship in the euro area, some 
studies appear to offer additional empirical hints of the existence of this relationship already. 
Fratzscher (2002) noted that financial convergence (measured by volatility of exchange rates) in the 
euro area was driven by the removal of uncertainty regarding monetary unification; if this is the case, 
the converse is likely to be true, i.e. that increased uncertainty regarding the next steps in the monetary 
union would lead to higher volatility. More recent work from Caporale, et al. (2016) also confirms 
asymmetrical responses to bad news during the euro area crisis, but also note that the responses were 
stronger in the PIIGS countries (Portugal, Ireland, Iceland, Greece, and Spain) both during and after 
the global financial crisis. The authors noted that already at the lower end of the euro area in terms 
of GDP and financial stability, the introduction of even-poorer countries to the EA after the crisis 
may have colored the perceptions of these markets unfavorably.  
 
3. Methodology and Data 
Hypothesis H1 
The hypotheses noted above require different approaches in order to explore the effects of euro 
introduction on stock markets in Europe. For Hypothesis H1, relating the introduction of the euro to 
changes in returns in the domestic aggregate stock market, we use an event study approach in the 
vein of Green & Bai (2008). The use of event studies is common in the finance literature to assess 
the impact of particular pieces of news on financial markets (Campbell, et al., 1997), and the adoption 
of the euro can be considered as a highly significant and only partially-anticipated news event (as 
noted in the introduction); indeed, euro introduction has the potential to lead to significant changes 
in the business and economic environment of the introducing country and can alter capital markets, 
firm strategies, and firm valuation in a manner which is unforeseeable in the medium-term.  
However, a possible criticism of this approach is that the euro was widely anticipated, and thus 
any effects its introduction may have had would already be priced into equity markets well before 
the date of introduction. Nevertheless, a key point to note, following Green & Bai (2008), in this 
paper we distinguish between what actually was anticipated (e.g. the timing of the euro’s 
introduction, “convergence criteria” tests, and conversion rates) and what could not be anticipated, 
in particular the exact macroeconomic and microeconomic situation of each country at the moment 
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of accession. Moreover, the cascading impact of the euro on very different countries being joined 
together under a single currency also is an effect that could not be anticipated but which financial 
markets would have had to adapt to across industries and at the country level (hence our emphasis 
on the aggregated response). Dissimilar fiscal and financial systems in the original Member States 
and, later, in the accession countries would have required the European Central Bank to alter its 
monetary policy for the euro, creating unanticipated consequences for markets. Additionally, at the 
microeconomic level, the euro introduction and/or its adoption was equivalent to structural financial 
reform, implying that firm-level information was not fully reflected in market variables until the 
structural shift itself was realized (Green & Bai, 2008; Eiling, et al., 2012). These arguments suggest 
that investors still had to deal with uncertainty in addition to the anticipated information available 
regarding the euro. This reality means that the reaction of market participants to euro 
introduction/adoption events still contains important nuggets of information that have not yet been 
mined but which can be visible in the aggregate abnormal responses of European markets.  
The event study utilized in this paper follows the conventional market model formulation 
(MacKinlay, 1997; Green & Bai, 2008), while the significance of abnormal returns is inferred through 
the use of event dummies, pioneered by Karafiath (1988): 
𝑅𝑘,𝑡
′ = 𝛼𝑘 + 𝛽𝑘 ⋅ 𝑀𝑡
′ + ∑ 𝛾𝑘,ℎ ⋅ 𝐷ℎ,𝑡
𝑇+𝑣
ℎ=𝑇−𝑢 + 𝑘,𝑡. (1) 
Raw data on daily stock indices (𝑃𝑘,𝑡 in the country k on trading day t) in 19-euro area countries 
is sourced from the Bloomberg database over the period January 1, 1996, to May 18, 2015, and 
transformed into logarithmic returns by: 𝑅𝑘,𝑡 = ln  𝑃𝑘,𝑡  − ln  𝑃𝑘,𝑡−1.  
To proxy for “normal” euro area market returns, we utilize market returns captured by log returns 
𝑀 𝑡
′  from the Eurostoxx 50 index, the leading blue-chip index for euro area exchanges, also sourced 
from Bloomberg. The inclusion of the Eurostoxx 50 index is taken to represent the euro-area 
“market,” a connected but supra-national exchange and an effective proxy for normal returns across 
the whole euro-area; the individual country markets are then compared against this total euro-area 
market to understand “abnormal” returns. This is a key difference from firm-level applications of the 
event study (MacKinlay, 1997) yet is fairly similar, as firm-level event studies utilize one firm against 
a total market, while in this example, we use one country level market against a total euro-area 
market. The statistical formulation of the problem remains the same as in the standard application of 
event studies (Campbell, et al., 1997).3  
 
3 Both a participant at one of the conferences this paper was presented at and an anonymous reviewer noted that country 
betas might have shifted over this period. However, the use of CAPM models in event studies such as this are exceedingly 
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Following Green & Bai (2008), we account for the differences between calendar time models, 
where returns are generated continuously, and trading time models, where returns are different after 
weekends and holidays (a crucial point, given that our research question is explicitly on returns 
surrounding a specific date – thus, we need to filter out any other effects which may have come 
because of that date). The daily data on returns are adjusted using the geometric mean of returns on 
Mondays and after holidays: 𝑅𝑘,𝑡
′ = 𝑅𝑘,𝑡/𝑛𝑡 and 𝑀𝑡
′ = 𝑀𝑡/𝑛𝑡, where 𝑛𝑡 is the difference in calendar 
days between two observed trading days. More importantly for our purposes, the presence of 
abnormal returns after the event is captured utilizing 𝑢 + 𝑣 + 1 daily dummies 𝐷ℎ,𝑡, equal to 1 when 
ℎ = 𝑡 and zero otherwise, where 𝑢 and 𝑣 are the corresponding numbers of days before and after the 
official event date T and h is a corresponding date within the event window.4 The estimation sample 
consists of one trading year estimation period and an event window (𝑇 − 𝑢, … , 𝑇, … , 𝑇 + 𝑣 ), where 
𝑇 is the official event date, either the day of the news announcing the euro’s introduction/adoption or 
the actual introduction/adoption itself. Data on the official government announcement of the 
introduction of the euro is collected from the official EU website http://europa.eu/. Similarly, the 
news dates on the intended euro introduction in the nineteen current euro area countries (11 founding 
and 8 non-founding members, see Appendix 1) also comes from EU sources. Descriptive statistics 
for daily and monthly logarithmic returns and squares of monthly zero-mean logarithmic returns, i.e. 
stock market volatility, are provided in Appendices 2–4. 
The dummy variable approach, being equivalent to the standard formulation of abnormal returns, 
allows us to test for the length of the abnormal responses applying an F-test on the joint significance 
of the parameters 𝛾𝑘,ℎ, ℎ = 𝑇 − 𝑢, … , 𝑇 + 𝑣. To be consistent with our monthly data analysis, the 
rationale for which is described below, we set 𝑢 = 0 and examine delayed responses up to 𝑣 = 20 
and 40 trading days ahead, i.e. approximately one and two trading months correspondingly. While 
admittedly an arbitrary cut-off, we set the post-event period at two trading months as we believe it is 
enough for the corresponding cumulative abnormal returns to return to normal; moreover, the 
 
rare – in a meta-analysis, Holler (2012) notes that 79.1% of studies use market models, while only 0.7% of papers 
surveyed use CAPM. Given the aggregated level of our analysis, and our believe that sector-specific beta trends would 
be washed out in the aggregate market trend, we follow the overwhelming majority of the literature in not using an explicit 
CAPM model. 
4 An anonymous reviewer noted that industry composition across European countries is not uniform, and that industry 
factors may have large returns on specific event dates (a point made by Eiling, et al., 2012). However, this point is 
immaterial, as even industry-driven responses to euro introduction – especially if that industry dominates a particular 
country‘s economy – only validates our hypothesis that the euro introduction would have an impact on a country at the 
aggregate level. We are not explicitly testing whether or not the transmission channel is industry or country-level, but 
rather what the response was based on the attributes of the joining country (and not the existing country). Moreover, 
Eiling, et al. (2012) also do not have any financial crisis data, meaning that the transmission channel may have flipped 
back to country-level attributes; we make no claim that it has, as it too is still immaterial to our research question. 
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probability of other, subsequent events not related to euro accession, is relatively low, meaning we 
can be fairly confident that we are capturing reactions specifically to the announcement or 
introduction of the currency.5  
Finally, as is standard in the event study literature, 𝑘,𝑡 is a zero mean, yet potentially 
conditionally heteroscedastic error term. Equation 1 is estimated using ordinary least squares (OLS) 
without robust heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent (HAC) corrections. As noted in 
Fomby & Murfin (2005), the application of HAC corrections in the event dummy case might result 
in misleading inference due to inconsistent estimates of dummy variable parameters 𝛾𝑘,ℎ. 
 
Hypotheses H2 and H3 
While an event study may capture abnormal returns within one country, we are also interested in 
the linkages between returns, volatility, and macroeconomic shocks (surprises) across countries, as 
shown in our Hypotheses H2 and H3. Moreover, there may be bias in the estimated parameters for 
dummy variables 𝛾𝑘,ℎ in the event study methodology Equation (1) if important conditioning 
variables such as investor sentiment or monetary and macroeconomic explanatory variables 
(controls) are omitted. Event studies, while being a useful tool, also suffer over longer timeframes as 
confounding effects or even overlapping events may vitiate the power of the study to pinpoint the 
exact effect of a particular event. While the event study approach shown above attempts to minimize 
these issues, as a further check to mitigate omitted variable and confounding problems, we turn to a 
univariate conditional heteroscedasticity model. The conditional mean of the model is formulated in 
the spirit of the behavioral arbitrage pricing theory (Lemmon & Portniaguina, 2006; Ho & Hung, 
2009; Chandra & Thenmozhi, 2017), which asserts that behavioral factors also play a role in setting 
asset prices; as a volatility model, it also contains conditional volatility dependence (3) and (4) 
encapsulated in an error term 𝑘,𝑚: 
𝑅𝑘,𝑚 = 𝛼𝑘 + 𝛽𝑘 ⋅ 𝑀𝑚 + ∑ 𝛾𝑘,𝑗 ⋅ 𝐷𝑗,𝑚
𝐾
𝑗=1 + 𝜋𝑘
′ ⋅ 𝑥𝑘,𝑚 + 𝑘,𝑚, (2) 
𝑘,𝑚 = 𝜎𝑘,𝑚 ⋅ 𝑢𝑘,𝑚, (3) 
𝜎𝑘,𝑚 = 𝑣( 𝑘,𝑚−1, 𝑘,𝑚−2, … , 𝜎𝑘,𝑚−1, 𝜎𝑘,𝑚−2, … , 𝐷1,𝑚, … , 𝐷𝐾,𝑚, 𝑥𝑘,𝑚), (4) 
 
5 Finally, this choice mirrors that of Green & Bai (2008). 
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where 𝑅𝑘,𝑚 denotes logarithmic returns in country k in trading month m and 𝑥𝑘,𝑚 represents a 
corresponding vector of macroeconomic, institutional, and sentiment controls containing exogenous 
variables and lags of potentially endogenous variables for the same country k.  
All macro-economic variables are defined as surprises, meaning the use of corresponding 
monthly growth rates or first differences for controls with units in percentage points. Unfortunately, 
as data on macroeconomic variables is, at best, available at a monthly frequency only, to link the 
different frequencies of the macroeconomic data and stock returns we transform the daily stock data 
into monthly logarithmic returns taking the difference between the first and the last trading day 
observations of the trading month and multiplying it by 100 to increase the convergence rate of 
optimization algorithms. This approach, while sacrificing some information clustered around the 
actual event and captured in daily data (as is already captured in the event study), allows for a wider 
range of macroeconomic, behavioral, and inertial controls to be included in Equation 2.6 Moreover, 
given the magnitude of the event, we anticipate that market reactions (and in particular volatility) 
will last for more than one day, and thus can be captured in a monthly aggregation.  
The event dummy variable 𝐷𝑗,𝑚 in Equation 2 then allows us to estimate the effect of the 
domestic euro introduction news or events on the local market returns and volatility, set at 1 during 
the event month and zero otherwise. Innovations 𝑢𝑘,𝑚 are assumed to be Gaussian, while all 
asymmetries are defined by the conditional variance function 𝑣(. ). To estimate Equations (2)–(4), 
we utilize the statistical package gig written by Lucchetti & Balietti (2011). 
The set of controls 𝑥𝑘,𝑚 includes spillover effects on domestic markets, which are captured by 
one-month lags of log-returns from the entire euro area (𝑀𝑚−1, as in Equation (1) and taken as the 
Eurostoxx 50). This approach, as in Fedorova & Saleem (2010), allows us to ascertain the impact of 
the news or events of the introduction of the euro in foreign markets on domestic market returns and 
volatility. Similarly, we anticipate that a significant result on 𝑀𝑚−1 also demonstrates an inertial 
effect present in foreign and domestic stock returns.  
Additional behavioral controls are proxied by the inclusion of an economic sentiment indicator 
(ESI) for either the whole EU (ESI EU), for the euro area (ESI EA), or at the individual country level 
 
6 Given our focus on the information that is encapsulated in the data, we also eschew the use of linear interpolation of 
monthly macroeconomic aggregates, as this would introduce information which may actually be at odds with the data 
itself. Indeed, macro news has many attributes which we feel are superior to interpolation, as news is: (1) calendar 
dependent with substantial publication lags; (2) realization of news is unknown before the announcement; and (3) events 
themselves are unknown before announcements. Finally, ex-post digestion of macroeconomic news includes the 
fundamental and non-fundamental factors that drive the stock market returns in the short run, and as such helps us to 
distill euro introduction effects more precisely. 
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(ESI), all of which were sourced from Eurostat. Finally, macroeconomic controls include several 
measures, which can influence firm valuation, including Eurostat and the ECB data on the narrow 
euro money supply (M1), the US dollar and euro exchange rate, industrial production indices, 
harmonized consumer price indices-based inflation rates, and unemployment rates. For 
computational simplicity, we will assume that the conditional volatility equation (4) has no other 
controls other than the event dummy variables.  
 To model the conditional volatility, we rely on an asymmetric conditional heteroscedasticity 
model from the asymmetric power-ARCH (APARCH) family, introduced in Ding, et al. (1993). The 
conditional variance (4) is specified as: 
𝜎𝑘,𝑚
𝛿𝑘 = 𝜔𝑘
′ 𝑥𝑘,𝑚 + ∑ 𝛼𝑘,𝑖
𝑞




𝑗=1 + ∑ 𝛽𝑘,𝑙𝜎𝑘,𝑚−𝑙
𝛿𝑘𝑝
𝑙=1 ,  (5) 
where the power parameter 𝛿𝑘 performs a Box-Cox transformation of the conditional standard 
deviation and is assumed to be positive (typically ranging between 0 and 2). Closer to zero values of 
this parameter will indicate a smaller sensitivity to outliers, i.e. bigger news effects. Special values 
of these parameters give rise to the particular cases, which, hence, could be tested. Seeking a more 
parsimonious model, the values of p and q are conventionally set to 1 or 2, although deeper 
dependences are also possible. 
The most widespread conditional volatility model utilized in an examination such as this is a 
GARCH model, pioneered by Bollerslev (1986), which is a special case of the APARCH model and 
imposes constraints of 𝛿𝑘 = 2, 𝛾𝑘,𝑗 = 0, 𝑗 = 1, … , 𝑞. However, a key drawback of GARCH is its 
symmetric response to positive and negative shocks, which may not be the case concerning the 
introduction of the euro. In particular, asymmetric responses of equity returns to news such as euro 
introduction are caused by leverage effects, which force debt to equity ratios to rise because of the 
decline in equity value. This, in turn, affects investors’ expectations of future cash flows and their 
perceptions of risk, as investors are likely to perceive their future cash flows as being riskier. The 
asymmetry in responses is also explained by the “volatility-feedback” hypothesis, which argues that 
if expected returns increase with rising stock volatility (likely to happen with the introduction of the 
euro), then stock prices should fall given the constant dividends. Bearing these arguments in mind, 
we include parameter 𝛾𝑘,𝑗 to capture asymmetric effects and we will test if 𝛾𝑘,𝑗 is significantly 
different from zero (Bekaert & Wu, 2000).  
The theoretical attractiveness of the APARCH specification shown in Equation 5 must be 
weighed against its computational intensity, i.e. solving an asymmetric non-linear problem estimated 
by maximum likelihood methods and using techniques to approximate the derivatives of the 
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likelihood function, an intensive process even when a number of controls is small7. To overcome this 
difficulty, we propose a two-step approach: in the first step, we assess which particular case of the 
volatility equation is the most probable according to APARCH estimates, using a parsimonious set 
of controls. For the second step, we re-estimate Equations 2, 3, and 5 as a system but using other 
streamlined APARCH models, including a conventional symmetric GARCH model, Geweke (1986) 
and Pantula (1986) asymmetric log-GARCH model (where 𝛿𝑘 → 0), Glosten, et al. (1993) GJR 
model (𝛿𝑘 = 2) and Zakoian (1994) TARCH model (𝛿𝑘 = 1) and TARCH’s symmetric counterpart, 
TS-GARCH model.  
 
4. Empirical findings 
4.1. Event study 
4.1.1 Founding Members 
We begin with the event study methodology of Equation 1 to trace the effects of the euro’s 
introduction on its founding members (Hypothesis 1). One of the immediate distinguishing factors of 
the founding members from members who were to join later (other than the possible endogeneity in 
timing the introduction of the euro) was the long run-up to the euro, and the reforms required, resulted 
in two discrete and separate announcements regarding the euro’s introduction before the currency 
was even actually introduced. The first announcement on the euro’s introduction was made 
simultaneously across the eleven founding members on June 17, 1997, with the adoption of the 
Stability and Growth Pact on fiscal rectitude within the euro area, while the second announcement, 
the European Council’s decision acknowledging that eleven countries had met the necessary 
conditions to introduce the single currency on 1 January 1999, occurred also simultaneously across 
EU states on March 3, 1998.  
[Table 1 here] 
Table 1 shows the result of the event study surrounding these two separate announcements, with 
Panel A examining abnormal returns surrounding the first announcement in 1997 and Panel B the 
returns associated with the second announcement in 1998 (Panel C shows the results surrounding the 
 
7 The problem becomes computationally more difficult in the presence of controls and dummy variables, when moving 
to more general omnibus of symmetric and asymmetric family GARCH models (Hentschel, 1995) or fractionally 
integrated APARCH (Tse, 1998). Moreover, our approach here is meant to capture short-memory processes rather than 
the long memory persistence embodied in fractional integration, which also argues for using a more “conventional” 
APARCH estimation strategy. 
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actual introduction of the currency in 1999). The results indicate that, even after accounting for highly 
significant and positive market conditions, the average residual daily returns varied from -0.0012 to 
0.0014 (any statistically significant deviations from the expected values are conventionally 
interpreted as abnormal returns or ARs). Despite the simultaneous announcements and introduction 
of euro events across the founding members, we see heterogeneous responses across Member State 
stock markets: this can be clearly seen in the reaction to the first announcement event, shown in Panel 
A, which appears to encompass country-specific attitudes towards the euro (euro enthusiastic or 
eurosceptic), a trait which can also be observed in the country’s cumulative abnormal returns (CARs, 
shown in Figure 3).  
[Figure 3 here] 
 
For example, German and Austrian financial markets, geographically proximate and 
economically interlinked, appeared to welcome the first announcement event, as did future members 
of the euro area situated on the periphery of the EU (Portugal, Ireland, and Finland). On the other 
hand, initial positive (abnormal) responses in Belgium, France, and Spain dissipated within a few 
trading weeks to a eurosceptic view, while Dutch markets showed little response.  
Overall, the analysis of individual abnormal returns and the heat map shown in Figure 4 show 
that it took about two trading weeks for markets to form a response to the news of the euro’s 
introduction or, alternately, to wait for lingering uncertainty surrounding the announcement to be 
resolved. After this initial two-week period, the second wave of ARs was observed approximately 
five trading weeks after the announcement, an effect that actually shaped and strengthened existing 
behavioral patterns. 
[Figure 4 here] 
Panel B of Table 1, showing market responses to the second announcement of the euro’s 
introduction, reveals behavioral shifts in several countries. Austria and Finland continue to show 
positive CARs, but significant negative CARs can be observed in the second trading month for 
German and Irish markets. Dutch traders again responded neutrally, with slightly negative, but 
insignificant daily ARs, and on average, delays in responses were higher for the second 
announcement (except in Ireland). As shown in the heat map, and unsurprisingly, financial markets 
were also less surprised by the second announcement compared to the first announcement, as the 
daily ARs were mild or neutral and much more delayed as compared to the first round.  
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Finally, Panel C in Table 1 shows the response of founding member financial markets to the 
actual introduction of the euro. Immediately, we can see that euro area markets responded much 
faster, as the first abnormal returns were already detected within the first and second trading weeks. 
Significant negative cumulative reactions were observed for the small open economies of Belgium 
and the Netherlands, while Austria, Finland, and Portugal responded positively (but, again, the 
Austrian market’s CARs were found to be statistically significant). According to the heat map in 
Panel C, the reaction of the largest euro-area economies – Germany, France, and Italy – in this case, 
was neutral, signifying that information regarding the euro introduction had long been priced-in.  
In sum, these findings confirm Green & Bai’s (2008) argument that the introduction of euro was 
a well-known and anticipated event of the third stage of EMU, as all founding members were required 
to meet the convergence criteria for monetary and fiscal policy and inflation to be an eligible member 
for EMU. However, the schedule of the third stage was flexible and could have started between 1996 
and 1999, and only the countries meeting the criteria could join the euro area. Therefore, there was 
some uncertainty about the number of joining countries, the timing, and the conditions to be imposed 
on the joining countries and the impact of the euro introduction on economies and markets of the 
joining countries (it is possible that this uncertainty could have been offset with the news of the euro 
conversion rates fixed in May 1998, announced before the conversion itself). Our results show that 
there was indeed still some uncertainty, as there was an asymmetry in market responses, dependent 
on a particular country, resulting in either observed negative or positive CARs after one or two trading 
months. Unfortunately, Table 1 shows that this effect was mainly statistically insignificant, with 
significance observed only in a few small and open founding members (Austria on the positive side 
and the Netherlands and Belgium on the negative side).  
Indeed, Austria is the only country where the stock market responded significantly positively in 
all 3 panels. As it will be shown in section 4.2, the deviation from historically-observed expected 
returns was mostly led by increases in the domestic economic sentiment index, implying that Austrian 
traders overreacted to euro events and the nature of the abnormality is a behavioral feature divorced 
from fundamentals. Such trading behavior appears to have been influenced by the winding path of 
Austria to the euro (Hochreiter & Tavlas, 2005); in particular, the idea of euro area accession began 
fairly early with debates on the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) and confidence that Austria would 
be able to fulfill interest rate and inflation rate criteria (but some uncertainty regarding the country’s 
fiscal path). However, the collapse of the government in 1995 jeopardized Austria’s ability to adopt 
the euro in the first wave precisely on fiscal grounds, and the successor government had to implement 
a fiscal consolidation plan to achieve the euro area fiscal criteria by 1997. In this sense, Austrian 
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traders appeared to view the overall sound fiscal policy immediately prior to the euro as locked-in, 
considering the 1992–1995 fiscal deficits as a temporary phenomenon that euro membership would 
prevent a return to. 
Such a response played out almost entirely in reverse in the Low Countries, which did not 
undergo such a drastic fiscal consolidation prior to the introduction of the euro. As Table 1 showed, 
there were pronounced negative reactions in the Netherlands and Belgium to euro introduction, 
responses we attribute to expected higher uncertainty about convergence criteria, credibility, fiscal 
policy adjustments, and overall market conditions.8 On the other hand, the ex-post analysis shows 
that there were no fundamental reasons for such pessimistic views: when looking at the fiscal 
experience in both countries ex-post, Fahrolz & Mohl (2003) found that the Netherlands and Belgium 
improved their budgetary positions much faster than the rest of the founding members. For example, 
in Belgium, the general government financial balance moved from a deficit of 2% of GDP in 1997 
to a surplus of 0.4% in 2001, while in the Netherlands, the fiscal stance went from a deficit of 1.1% 
of GDP in 1997 to a slight (0.1%) surplus in 2001. Moreover, the decrease in the debt-to-GDP ratio 
in 1997–2001 was around 12% of GDP for Belgium and 17% of GDP for the Netherlands, while in 
France, Luxembourg, and Germany improved just by 1–2% of GDP. 
 
4.1.2 Non-Founding Members 
The founding members of the euro were more intimately acquainted with and invested in the 
euro’s launch, perhaps muting the effect on returns due to the greater information available in the 
long run-up. For non-founding members, however, there was less information (only one 
announcement) and greater informational asymmetry on the possible consequences of the euro’s 
adoption, an asymmetry which may have been contingent on the timing of the introduction of the 
common currency (Hypothesis 2). We turn to examine the responses of these eight non-founding 
members of the euro area, the results of which are reported in Table 2 for the euro adoption 
announcement news (Panel A) and the actual euro adoption event (Panel B). As an interesting 
experiment, we also consider two cases where the Member States attempted to enter the euro area 
but failed to comply with the convergence criteria; the reactions in Lithuania and Greece on their 
failed first attempts are shown in Panel C. 
 
8 These findings are in line with Green and Bai (2008), where significant negative CARs were also detected for Belgium 
and the Netherlands. 
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[Table 2 here] 
As can be seen in Table 2, the non-founding countries have very weak links to Eurostoxx 
variables, reflected in small and often insignificant elasticity parameters for market returns, and 
average daily returns vary from -0.005 to 0.0021. Moreover, the adjusted R-squared values are 
significantly lower than the 0.36–0.87 range found for the founding member regressions, due mainly 
to the inclusion of many dummy variables, which have turned out to be insignificant. 
[Figure 5 here] 
Overall, the pre-crisis period showed the little-to-no response of local markets to the news on the 
adoption of the euro, as CARs in this period were slightly negative for all countries which adopted 
the euro pre-crisis (Greece, Slovenia, Cyprus, Malta, and Slovakia) but insignificant (Figure 5). 
Similarly, the heat maps are shown in Figure 6 also indicate a neutral stance for most acceding 
markets pre-crisis to the announcement of the euro’s introduction. In these cases, it is also probable 
that markets had priced in the euro’s introduction and, occurring in an era of relative calm, (good) 
news on the euro had little additional information for investors. 
However, and in stark contrast, there are highly significant heterogeneous CARs for pre-crisis 
euro adoption events. As shown in Panel B of Table 2, markets in Cyprus and Malta – both small and 
very financially open economies, as shown in Appendix 5 – exhibited a significant level of euro-
skepticism immediately following the euro’s introduction, while Slovenian markets were 
significantly positive in their assessment of the currency. The reason for these results may be traced 
back to the exigencies of the countries involved. In the first instance, the island countries of Cyprus 
and Malta share many similarities: Cyprus has experienced substantial macroeconomic and financial 
imbalances combined with a growing offshore banking sector not in line with the acquis, while Malta 
has also been plagued with extensive fiscal issues, including an expanding government deficit and a 
bloated public sector (Van Eden, et al., 2000).9 Second, Malta and Cyprus adopted a similar “big 
bang” approach in switching over to the euro without a transition period, an abrupt change that created 
fears in the markets of immediate price increases on the changeover in both countries (Lomas, 2007).  
[Figure 6 here] 
 
9 However, whereas the Cypriot population mainly welcomed the euro, the Maltese exhibited intense domestic 




Contrary to this experience, euro adoption in Slovenia was also highly debated by the public, with 
opponents and proponents of an early adoption both making their case in the press. While opponents 
preferred a slow approach with prolonged monetary independence, the views on early adoption 
dominated and resulted in the government pledging for rapid euro adoption. The ongoing discussions 
led to presumably higher uncertainty, but, nevertheless, the European Commission (Eurobarometer, 
2007) had very positive views on Slovenia’ changeover to the euro: one year after the event, 95% of 
Slovenians confirmed that the changeover had been smooth and efficient, and 92% of Slovenians 
were happy with the level of information they had received from the government. And, although 
Slovenia also took a “big bang” approach in adopting the euro, it is possible that the optimism 
surrounding the adoption meant that inflationary fears were subsumed to the perceived benefits that 
the euro would bring.   
A final note about euro adoption pre-crisis concerns Greece, which attempted once before to enter 
the euro area on its inception but only entered the currency union in 2001. The missed attempt in 
1998 as a result of failing to meet convergence criteria, as its inflation rate was 3% over limit, its 
interest rates were 11 points above limits, its deficit to GDP ratio was well beyond Maastricht limits, 
and its debt to GDP ratio was almost double what Maastricht required (Mundell, 1998). By 2001, 
however, Greece had satisfied the euro area and acceded to the currency amid the post-technology 
boom slowdown but still a pre-global financial crisis. As Panel C of Table 2 shows, the effect of 
missing the euro in 1998 was actually greeted by markets as a positive; perhaps in the knowledge 
that the Greek economy was not yet ready for the loss of monetary policy independence (whether or 
not it was ready in 2001 is a point to debate elsewhere). 
Turning to the post-crisis period, all Baltic countries announced and adopted euro in the post-
crisis period with the official euro adoption coming more as a formality rather than an unanticipated 
event; indeed, in addition to the local currency, the Baltics had all become euroized to some extent, 
with Levasseur (2015) noting that, at the end of 2014, Latvia and Estonia saw approximately 90% of 
its banks loans denominated in euros (in Lithuania at the same time, a comparatively smaller 75% of 
loans were denominated in euros, along with 25% of bank deposits). It was perhaps this familiarity 
with the euro that explains the results in Table 2, namely that the announcement of euro introduction 
was greeted with little fanfare in Latvia and Estonia, while the introduction of the euro had little effect 
on CARs in all three of the economies (the heat map in Figure 6 also shows that any reactions to euro 
news came on the adoption new rather than the actual introduction of the currency).  
The only outlier from these patterns is Lithuania. Indeed, Lithuania is a special case similar to 
Greece, in that it also attempted to enter the euro once previously, in 2006. However, what makes 
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Lithuania doubly interesting is that its first attempt came pre-crisis, but its actual accession came 
post-crisis. As Panel C of Table 2 shows, there was a negative reaction in the markets pre-crisis when 
Lithuania failed to enter the euro, and the President of Lithuania said in an interview to Euronews.com 
that this was due to the “unwillingness of the EU to expand the Eurozone.” However, the polls at that 
time showed that approximately one-third of the country was strongly opposed to introducing the 
Euro, a consistent level of opposition which might explain why the news for Lithuania’s actual 
accession post-crisis also was followed by a significant negative reaction: while 54% of Lithuanians 
polled in the Eurobarometer in 2007 (after the first attempt) were still in favor of joining the euro, 
public polls held before Lithuania’s accession revealed that only 44% of respondents believed in a 
positive effect of the euro on Lithuania’s economy and 48% of respondents thought it would be 
negative (Eurobarometer, 2014). This pessimism on the euro almost certainly drove higher levels of 
uncertainty in Lithuanian financial markets, resulting in negative ARs when the euro introduction 
was announced. The reality of the euro introduction, however, had little effect, suggesting that the 
political worries surrounding the euro dissipated when financial markets saw the economic benefits 
(a finding seemingly confirmed in Alexakis et al. 2016).  
 
4.2. Univariate conditional heteroscedasticity models 
4.2.1 Pre-testing of asymmetric effects 
Before directly testing Hypotheses H2 and H3, it is important to establish that there is indeed 
asymmetry in the volatility responses to news of euro introduction, and how this impacts the 
persistence of volatility and the reaction to outliers. As noted above, we use a two-step process of 
estimation, first with an unrestricted APARCH (1, 1) model and second with model restrictions for 
the power (δ) and asymmetry (γ) parameters; to ascertain best fit of the restricted model, we base our 
choice on minimization of the AIC criterion.  
[Table 3 here] 
The results of this pre-specification strategy are shown in Table 3, indicating that asymmetric 
conditional volatility models are not necessarily appropriate for euro area stock markets. Only five 
cases out of 18 showed significant asymmetric effects mostly described by TARCH models, with the 
Austrian stock market best described by a GJR-GARCH approach. The distribution of the significant 
asymmetric effects was split between founding and non-founding members, with two founding and 
three non-founding members displaying asymmetric effects to the euro introduction. Concerning 
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non-founding members, such effects were found for insular small open economies of Malta and 
Cyprus, and Greece heavily hit by the global crisis. Somewhat surprisingly, Maltese traders tend to 
over-react to positive news, while Greece and Cyprus have an asymmetric response that follows more 
conventional patterns.  
Our pre-testing exercise also revealed that more than half of EA stock markets are less sensitive 
to outliers, since power transformation parameter 𝛿𝑖 is approximately equal to one. At the same time, 
the persistence of volatility equations is high as the inertia related β parameters are relatively higher 
than α. Finally, symmetric GARCH or TS-GARCH models, including three cases for post-crisis 
entrants (i.e. the Baltic States) are the models of best fit for the rest of the countries under 
examination. 
 
4.2.2 Founding Members 
Following Engle, et al. (1990), the next step is to test for the presence of volatility spillover 
effects conditioned on local and foreign macroeconomic conditions; this first step continues our 
discussion presented in the event study but includes additional macroeconomic and behavioral 
controls. As noted above, this new specification includes market spillovers, an economic sentiment 
index (ESI) for both the EU and the euro area, narrow money (M1), and industrial production, 
unemployment, and inflation to explain the nature of abnormality observed in daily stock market 
returns. Using these controls in addition to the euro event dummies (D1news for the first 
announcement and D2news for the second announcement), we may now proceed to explicitly test 
Hypotheses H2 and H3. 
[Table 4 here] 
The results of this expanded model are shown in Tables 4 (the conditional mean) and 5 
(conditional volatility) for the founding members of the euro. As can be seen in the respective Panel A 
of each Table, news regarding the introduction of euro had diverse impacts on the founding members’ 
stock markets, one that appeared not driven by trade linkages (see Appendix 6). The estimates of both 
conditional mean and variance equations for Germany, France, and Italy (i.e. the drivers of the euro) 
were unaffected by foreign euro news in both the pre- and post-crisis periods. Indeed, the founding 
members, in general, saw no significant effects due to foreign euro news in the pre-crisis period, apart 
from the Portuguese market’s enthusiasm for euro adoption in Slovenia. Schukkink & Niemman 
(2012) argue that this Portuguese support for enlargement could originate from Portugal’s own period 
24 
 
of accession negotiations, creating a sense of solidarity and identification with the Central and 
European accession states (indeed, Portuguese preferences for Eastern enlargement were formed 
already by the late 1980s and have been consistently maintained).  
Another interesting case concerns euro adoption in Slovakia, which came in the middle of the global 
financial crisis and when the ratio between benefits and costs of membership in the EMU were 
undergoing a significant shift. Given rising uncertainty and financial shocks emanating from the 
United States, the attractiveness of the participation in the euro area increased for the potential 
members including Slovakia but also could have reduced the attractiveness of new members to 
already-existing euro adopters. In line with this conjecture, and as shown in Table 4, the founding 
members reacted strongly negatively to the euro introduction announcement in Slovakia in July 2008. 
However, just six months later, when the global financial crisis was well underway, markets reversed 
themselves and welcomed Slovakia’s accession, a consequence of Slovakia’s relatively resilient 
economy (and especially its financial sector). In other words, Slovakia was tested immediately and 
found to be a worthy addition to the common currency, a fact borne out by the reality that Slovakia 
was not highly exposed to the subsequent sovereign debt crisis (Kliber & Płuciennik, 2017).10  
Moreover, our estimates show that Belgium, Ireland, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands 
welcomed foreign euro news and exhibited significantly decreased volatility in the pre-crisis period, 
with Spanish markets, in particular, have higher expected returns and less volatility due to Latvia’s 
announced embrace of the euro. Foreign euro news also appeared to bring lower volatility to Belgian 
and Dutch markets both in pre- and post-crisis periods. Perhaps not coincidentally, these countries 
also had the largest financial openness and financial linkages within the EA (as detailed in 
Appendix 5), meaning that the benefits of expanding the euro (in terms of financial depth and lowered 
transaction costs) would intuitively be welcomed. 
[Table 5 here] 
In contrast to the announcements of the euro’s introduction, the actual introduction of the 
common currency had strong effects in Belgium, France, and the Netherlands (see Table 4, Panel B). 
Even after controlling for additional factors, the negative results for Belgium and the Netherlands are 
in line with our previous event study findings, while French markets appeared to be enthusiastic about 
the euro introduction event. The enlargement of the euro area, on the other hand, created little 
volatility (Table 5, Panel B), as Austria, Belgium, and the Netherlands had insignificant responses to 
 
10 Of course, there is a measure of endogeneity in this, as Kiohos & Stoupos (2018, p. 181) argue that “the euro behaved 
as a shield against the global financial shock for Slovakia.” 
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euro introduction in the pre-crisis period while Germany, France, Italy, Luxembourg, and Portugal 
saw a significant diminishing of volatility accompanying Slovenia’s entry. Indeed, this result is 
doubly interesting given what we know ex-post, as Slovenia appeared to be a strong candidate for 
early accession to the euro area ex-ante (Kozamernik, 2004); however, after accession, it saw a rapid 
deterioration of its fundamentals, mainly due to the global financial crisis but also due to poor policies 
(in particular delayed pension and labor reforms), and, in some eyes, euro accession itself, which 
triggered an unsustainable boom in lending (Connolly & Hartwell, 2014; Guardiancich, 2016). 
Finally, only Finnish markets seemed skeptical of the euro’s introduction in Greece in the pre-crisis 
period, but a volatility spillover effect was not observed in this market (Table 5).   
Our results change noticeably in the post-crisis period, as anticipated in Hypothesis H2. Indeed, 
euro introduction events in Estonia depressed market returns in Germany, Spain, Luxembourg, and 
the Netherlands. However, except for France and Estonia, the spread of the euro implied decreases 
in volatility in most countries; this partially confirms the “heat wave” hypothesis, which argues that 
market volatility is a local phenomenon and does not spread with the euro adoption event in the other 
market. However, the “meteor shower” in the case of the euro’s spread may have an unanticipated 
effect, in that the shower is cooling (in terms of volatility) rather than adding heat. Indeed, this result, 
of asymmetric volatility spillover effects in tandem with foreign euro adoption news, confirms 
Hypothesis H3.  
Finally, the results presented in Panel C of Table 4 suggest that the addition of these controls can 
help to explain some of the movement in stock markets in the euro area. In particular, common market 
spillover effects, defined by the lagged value of the Eurostoxx index, are very strong in all founding 
members with a significant impact on the conditional mean in all countries (varying from 0.68 to 
1.07). On the other hand, monthly changes in narrow money were significant in only Italian and 
Belgian stock markets; similarly, country-level developments in domestic labor markets and rising 
inflation were limited in significance to Portugal, the Netherlands, Italy, and Germany. In terms of a 
behavioral effect, Luxembourgish, Finish, and Irish traders have the least correlation with the ESI 
variables, while southern countries (Spain, France, Italy, and Portugal) are more responsive to ESI in 
the euro area. This is in line with strong sentiment effects found in Spanish and French stock markets 
by Corredor, et al. (2013). The results in Panel C also suggest that mostly autoregressive (inertial) or 
GARCH effects are dominant in the models for founding members, while ARCH effects are relatively 




4.2.3 Non-Founding Members 
Having a long history of euro area membership, we anticipated that the founding members were 
expected to respond more to the enlargement of the euro area with asymmetric impacts on their stock 
markets (Hypothesis H3). It is not as evident that the eight non-founding euro area members, having 
a much shorter span of membership, would also have such effects, but testing this proposition is the 
purpose of this section (results summarized in Tables 6 and 7). 
[Tables 6 and 7 here] 
The results reported in Table 6 (Panel A) show no return mean dependence on euro adoption news 
in non-founding members, which could be explained by the low interdependence of these markets 
with each other. The insignificant reactions of non-founding members to local euro adoption news 
both in pre-crisis and post-crisis periods are consistent with the event study results (Table 2) in most 
of our cases, except for Greece. In fact, Greek traders have a strongly negative response to additional 
euro members, especially Lithuania, even after controlling for behavioral effects. Such a response 
was natural given the timing of Lithuania’s accession in 2015, which occurred during the “Grexit 
discussion” and the real worry that Greece could be leaving the euro area (Hodson, 2015). Volatility 
spillover effects are not observed in Greece and Cyprus concerning euro adoption news, but a 
decrease of volatility can be seen in foreign euro introduction news for non-founding members similar 
to founding members, both in the pre-crisis and post-crisis periods. The calming “meteor shower” 
behavior is observed locally for the tightly interrelated stock markets of the Baltic States, especially 
in the response to Lithuania as the last of the three countries to join the euro area, while the rest of 
the cases explored here seem to have responses driven by local (country-level) effects rather than 
euro accession per se. 
The results reported in Panel B of Tables 6 and 7 show no return mean dependence of financial 
markets of non-founding members on the actual euro adoption event in non-founding members. Only 
Slovenia exhibits an economically significant reaction to the local euro adoption event, which 
comports with the results discussed in the event study (see in Table 2). Greek markets appear to 
demonstrate a eurosceptic response to euro adoption in Lithuania, reflecting prolonged economic 
difficulties and the risks associated with a possible Greek exit from the euro both before and during 
the Lithuanian adoption of the common currency. At the same time, Greek traders appeared to care 
less about the risks of other new entrants of the euro area, as volatility remained unresponsive to the 
events in both the pre-crisis and post-crisis period (in line with the “heat wave” hypothesis). The 
volatility model also fails to capture significant responses in Malta and Cyprus, a divergence from 
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the event study approach. In fact, the findings indicate the sensitivity of results in some markets to 
the inclusion of additional controls: strong spillover effects are observed for all non-founding 
members except Slovenia, while later entrants of the euro area are more responsive to EU economic 
sentiment index and half of them are positively related to local sentiments. This fact which actually 
helps us to explain the abnormal effects detected in the event study while illustrating that other factors 
than the euro are at play. Finally, the local calming spillover effects as the result of euro adoption in 
Lithuania are again observed in the responses of the Baltic States, which all joined the euro area in 
the post-crisis period. 
In sum, our findings confirm both asymmetric and diverse responses of existing member 
countries depending on which country is joining. But the “meteor shower” has a cooling down effect 
on volatility for highly interrelated markets such as the Baltic States or, as seen in the Slovenian case, 
with founding members in the pre-crisis period. 
 
5. Conclusions 
Although euro adoption is one of the most important events in European financial history, the 
euro adoption announcement and event effects are largely unexplored in the literature. Our paper is 
the first to examine the effects of both euro adoption news and the actual introduction of the euro in 
founding and non-founding members. Our results show that markets were discriminating in their 
responses, which were highly heterogeneous and dependent upon the country joining the euro and 
the country stock market of interest. In particular, the event study findings confirmed Green & Bai’s 
(2008) argument that the euro adoption was a well-known and scheduled event of the third stage of 
EMU, with low uncertainty about conditions of the euro accession. However, our results vary from 
this earlier work, as non-founding members, with less information on euro area effects, had 
substantial changes in their returns, albeit only in the pre-crisis period.   
Heterogeneity also reared its head regarding asymmetric responses to euro introduction pre- and 
post-crisis, as the pre-crisis period showed the little-to-no response of local markets to the news on 
the adoption of the euro. In the post-crisis period, news of euro introduction had a strong impact in 
Lithuania, but the introduction of the euro had little effect (as hinted at by Alexakis et al., 2016), 
suggesting that the political worries surrounding the euro dissipated when financial markets saw the 
possible economic benefits.   
Perhaps our most interesting result is that, with regard to spillover effects, founding members, in 
general, were undisturbed by additional euro introductions pre-crisis but actually saw decreased 
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volatility in the post-crisis period from additional members (with the most financially open countries 
welcoming the euro’s expansion the most). For the non-founding members, in general, there also was 
a reduction in volatility both in the pre-crisis and post-crisis periods. The “meteor shower” and “heat 
wave” hypotheses developed in Engle, et al. (1990) are useful in explaining our results, which 
confirm the asymmetric and diverse responses of existing member countries dependent upon which 
country is joining. However, as demonstrated, the “meteor shower” of the euro appeared to be a cool 
shower rather than a hot one, lessening volatility across borders. 
The implications of this finding call for more investigation into the political economy of euro 
expansion; for example, the relief felt by the markets of founding members when new entrants joined 
in the post-crisis period could have been related to a renewed faith in the currency’s viability (Hobolt 
& Wratil, 2015) and/or the relief felt by bringing in fairly stable member states who had been properly 
vetted and were already on the path of convergence (Franks, et al., 2018). Additional work in this 
vein, digging deeper into each specific case and especially the negotiations surrounding accession 
from the existing Member State side, might shed more light on how markets would have perceived 
the new members in the interim between the announcement of adoption and actual adoption. 
Econometrically this may encompass utilizing an alternative bivariate fractionally integrated 
APARCH-DCC modeling framework (Alexakis, et al., 2016) to study the directional impacts of euro 
area enlargement or perhaps even moving to a global vector regressive model which allows for the 
direct inclusion of trade and financial links and spillovers in a unified framework. In another 
direction, the dampened volatility in the new members may have been predicated on purely internal 
conditions and an anticipation effect from the euro’s introduction (see Epstein & Johnson [2010] for 
a disaggregation of some of these effects by country), while any subsequent crisis may change their 
response to additional entrants (again dependent upon the particulars of any new members). More 
carefully examining the internal conditions of both founding members and new entrants to the euro 
area to ascertain which was most important for driving market responses is also a natural extension 
to our work here.  
In any event, this paper, by systematically exploring the reactions of markets to euro adoption, 
has made a modest contribution to understanding the dynamics of financial markets to the common 
currency. It is clear, however, that more work is called for in understanding the circumstances behind 
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Table 1: Founding members’ market reaction to the euro introduction related events 



















AT   
 -0.0003  0.48*** 
9, 11, 22, 24, 26, 
28, 38  0.029 0.22 0.057*** 0.01 0.39 291 
BE   
 0.0002  0.63*** 
9, 11, 13, 31, 33, 
34, 38 0.002* 0.06 -0.051*** 0.00 0.54 293 
DE    -0.0001 0.98*** 9, 19, 26, 28, 34, 36 0.021 0.16 0.032** 0.02 0.70 295 
ES    0.0003 0.83*** 11, 22, 23, 26, 27 0.020 0.69 -0.049*** 0.00 0.52 292 
FI    0.0004   0.87*** 27, 34 0.022 0.89 0.055 0.33 0.45 293 
FR   -0.0000  0.99*** 6, 11 -0.021 0.40 -0.063 0.65 0.60 294 
IE    0.0005 0.50*** 32, 38 0.000 0.61 0.039 0.23 0.36 295 
NL   0.0002  1.10*** 22, 31, 39 0.022 0.96 -0.004 0.27 0.70 295 
PT    0.0011*** 0.38*** 11, 12, 14, 17, 37 0.015** 0.03 0.037 0.17 0.17 282 
Panel B: Second announcement, 05.03.1998 
AT    -0.0004  0.73*** 16, 33-35, 38, 39 0.014 0.83 0.046** 0.03 0.52 288 
BE    -0.0002  0.73*** 24 0.022 0.99 0.053 0.81 0.66 290 
DE    0.0001 1.06*** 23, 31, 38,39, 40 -0.016 0.91 -0.046*** 0.00 0.75 290 
ES    0.0005 0.80*** 11, 29, 35 0.054 0.81 0.021 0.35 0.65 286 
FI    0.0005  0.97*** 11, 13, 29, 36 -0.023 0.28 0.050* 0.08 0.64 289 
FR   -0.0003 0.95*** 18, 40 0.048 0.46 0.058 0.63 0.70 291 
IE    0.0014*** 0.46*** 0, 9, 18, 24, 38 -0.011 0.14 -0.046** 0.03 0.43 290 
NL   0.0001 1.07*** 36, 38 -0.036 0.93 -0.013 0.66 0.79 291 
PT    0.0013*** 0.61*** 36, 38 0.035 0.96 0.038 0.59 0.45 282 
Panel C: Euro introduction event, 01.01.1999 
AT    -0.0012  0.67*** 9, 16, 23, 26, 31 -0.021 0.11 0.093** 0.02 0.51 289 
BE    0.0006 0.61*** 2, 9, 27, 37 -0.085*** 0.00 -0.105*** 0.00 0.66 292 
DE    -0.0006  0.93*** 4, 27, 34 0.003 0.35 -0.006 0.47 0.74 293 
ES    0.0005 0.94*** 7, 22, 26, 27, 32, 33 -0.061 0.34 -0.032* 0.08 0.79 287 
FI    0.0008  0.99*** 3, 4, 24 0.038 0.26 0.052 0.27 0.64 290 
FR   0.0004  0.94*** 6, 29, 34, 39 0.004 0.60 -0.027 0.49 0.87 290 
IE    0.0001 0.52*** 2, 21 0.003 0.61 0.054 0.45 0.33 289 
IT  -0.0002  1.04*** 3, 11, 27, 36 -0.021 0.29 0.014 0.24 0.74 290 
NL   0.0001 0.95*** 3, 12, 19, 26, 33 -0.062*** 0.00 -0.052*** 0.01 0.85 293 
PT    -0.0001  0.81*** - 0.005 0.84 0.019 0.94 0.53 287 
Significance levels: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1% 
Notes: significant lags denote at least at 5% level significant abnormal returns with positive values marked in bold. CAR 
stands for cumulative abnormal returns, where 1 month is tested after 20 trading days and 2 months after 40 trading days. 
Columns for p-value are used to test the joint significance of dummy variables by a corresponding F-test for omitted 
variables up to 1 trading month and 2 trading months. Due to the missing observations, Italy and Luxembourg are not 




Table 2: Non-Founding members’ market reactions to the euro adoption announcement and the euro 
adoption events   
Panel A:  Euro adoption announcement 


















GR   20.06.2000 -0.0005  0.29*** - -0.041 1.00 -0.079 1.00 -0.07 293 
SI   02.03.2006 0.0003 -0.01 - -0.016 1.00 -0.043 1.00 -0.11 278 
CY   16.05.2007 0.0018** 0.55*** 0 -0.012 1.00 -0.012 0.98 0.01 288 
MT   16.05.2007 -0.0001  0.02 - -0.014 1.00 0.004 0.97 -0.09 283 
SK   07.05.2008 -0.0001 0.18 - -0.021 0.43 -0.045 0.40 0.01 76 
EE   03.07.2010 0.0021**  0.18*** 7, 24  -0.024 0.82 0.003 0.86 0.00 295 
LV   09.07.2013 0.0008* 0.08** 5, 32, 40 0.054 0.22 0.022 0.32 0.03 291 
LT   23.07.2014 0.0003 0.14*** 11, 12 -0.048*** 0.00 -0.051* 0.09 0.10 291 
Panel B: Euro adoption event 
GR   01.01.2001 -0.0014 0.28*** 7, 21 0.018 0.28 0.087 0.69 0.03 291 
SI   
01.01.2007 0.0012***  0.00 
1, 2, 11, 16, 
20, 35 0.093*** 0.00 0.063*** 0.00 0.11 284 
CY   
01.01.2008 0.0004 0.76*** 
1, 6, 7, 10, 
16, 17, 21 -0.040*** 0.00 -0.100*** 0.00 0.41 280 
MT   
01.01.2008 -0.0000 0.08** 
2, 12, 16, 21, 
34, 35 ,36 -0.014*** 0.00 -0.040 0.15 0.17 269 
SK   01.01.2009 -0.0050 0.03 - 0.008 1.00 -0.032 1.00 -0.14 62 
EE   01.01.2011 0.0018** 0.30*** 3 0.007 0.65 -0.020 0.99 0.01 292 
LV   01.01.2014 0.0007 0.05 13 0.016 0.76 -0.003 0.98 -0.06 287 
LT   01.01.2015 0.0002 0.08** 17, 19, 24 0.011 0.56  0.032 0.54 -0.02 291 
Panel C: Failed to meet convergence criteria 
GR 05.03.1998 0.0011 0.1424 0, 1, 5, 16, 17 0.0828*** 0.01  0.1062*** 0.00 0.21 292 
LT 16.05.2006 0.0001 0.0138 5, 11, 20, 23, 27 -0.1089*** 0.00 -0.0714** 0.01 0.09 249 
Significance levels: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1% 





Table 3: Unrestricted APARCH (1, 1) models and restricted model selection  
Panel A: Founding members 
Country Intercept, ω Power, δ (st. err.) Asymmetry, γ α β Restricted model n 
AT   3.37** 1.65(2.49) 0.97** 0.09 0.56*** GJR 230 
BE 1.92*** 1.28(0.92) 0.53** 0.32*** 0.49*** TARCH 230 
DE   0.09 1.80(1.11) -0.18 0.11*** 0.88*** GARCH 230 
ES   0.56** 0.64(1.45) 0.48 0.11 0.85*** TS-GARCH 230 
FI   0.18 2.22(0.73) -0.04 0.15*** 0.84*** GARCH 230 
FR  0.06 2.17(2.47) 0.03 0.08 0.86*** GARCH 230 
IE   1.00 3.07(11.43) 0.09 0.13 0.74*** GARCH 222 
IT   0.61 0.90(0.89) -0.16 0.17*** 0.79*** TS-GARCH 207 
LU   3.03** 0.47(0.49) 0.05 0.28*** 0.61*** TS-GARCH 194 
NL  0.33 0.37(0.51) -0.10 0.14** 0.83*** TS-GARCH 230 
PT   1.89 2.26(3.27) -0.04 0.12 0.75*** GARCH 230 
Panel B: Non-founding members 
GR   2.86* 0.74(0.51) 0.35* 0.17** 0.81*** TARCH 230 
SI   0.70 0.41(0.51) -0.21 0.13** 0.86*** TS-GARCH 177 
CY   9.39 1.20(0.89) 0.99** 0.06* 0.87*** TARCH 126 
MT   4.33*** 1.13(0.78) -0.53** 0.25*** 0.58*** TARCH 230 
EE   1.72 0.23(0.49) -0.26 0.19** 0.81*** TS-GARCH 222 
LV   1.70 0.32(0.42) -0.31 0.16*** 0.83*** TS-GARCH 182 
LT   0.90 1.50(0.76) -0.01 0.19*** 0.81*** GARCH 182 
Significance levels: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1% 
Notes: Slovakia has no continuous monthly data and is removed from our further analysis. Seeking to stabilize the 
convergence of the estimation algorithm, all variables, except dummy variables, where transformed multiplying by a 





Table 4: Founding members’ market reaction to euro adoption announcement and the euro adoption 
event, conditional mean equation 
Country AT   BE DE   ES   FI   FR  IE   IT   LU   NL  PT   
Panel A: euro announcement events 
D1news -2.85 0.14 -2.08 2.04 -2.77 2.80** -3.19  --  -- 0.98 2.91 
D2news -0.38 3.24+ -2.28 4.69+ -4.65 3.68*** -2.56 10***   -- -3.16+ 7.04* 
Dnews.gr 0.96 3.65+ -2.06 -0.07 -2.90 1.41+ 1.21 4.16+ 7.19+ 3.35+ 2.64 
Dnews.si -0.12 0.06 -1.20 4.38+ 1.23 -0.94 2.42 1.32 -0.47 -0.41 7.23* 
Dnews.mt.cy 0.24 -0.34 2.39+ 4.12+ 2.74 -0.10 1.20 -2.93 1.71 -0.96 6.48+ 
Dnews.sk 6.62+ -6.50** 0.02 -1.58 1.46 -1.00 -14*** -4.82+ -7.19** -6.50*** -5.79+ 
Dnews.ee 1.61 -1.71 0.96 -0.89 0.94 -0.23 5.17+ 1.10 1.09 1.13 2.23 
Dnews.lv -1.60 -1.08 -0.97 5.49* 2.55 -0.43 -4.32+ -1.64 -4.24 -2.84+ -1.25 
Dnews.lt -4.94+ 2.02 -0.84 -0.05 4.18 -0.66 0.86 -0.24 3.07 1.34 -11*** 
Panel B: euro introduction events 
Deuro -7.80+ -5.23* -4.04+ -4.76+ 0.95 2.63** -2.14 -1.18  -- -6.02** 2.75 
Deuro.gr 3.24 0.27 5.39** 7.19** -19*** 1.31+ 1.68 3.51+ 6.96+ 1.55 8.95** 
Deuro.si 0.19 -0.02 0.45 1.63 3.52 0.04 -2.09 -0.20 2.38 -0.60 1.29 
Deuro.mt.cy -5.53+ 0.27 -1.43 -0.25 3.66 -0.23 7.04* 4.33+ -0.49 -1.36 -3.29 
Deuro.sk 6.35+ 5.96* 1.18 -1.28 2.35 0.44 8.09* 0.17 3.20 10.72*** 6.56+ 
Deuro.ee -5.53+ -1.30 -4.17* 4.46+ -3.72 0.12 -6.13+ 2.93+ -10.99** -4.06* -0.78 
Deuro.lv 2.08 1.00 0.46 2.35 -1.02 0.08 4.31+ 6.07** 1.27 -1.03 2.67 
Deuro.lt -3.37 3.63+ 1.97 -5.95* 0.49 2.04+ -0.89 1.27 -1.26 -0.27 -0.86 
Panel C: control variables 
Intercept 0.49 0.56* 0.29+ 0.09 -0.56 -0.03 -0.29 -0.02 0.35 0.18 0.19 
Market 
spillover 
0.68*** 0.68*** 1.07*** 0.89*** 1.07*** 0.93*** 0.70*** 0.99*** 0.89*** 0.96*** 0.79*** 
ESI, EA 0.04 0.03 -0.31+ 0.64* 0.39 0.30** 0.08 0.21 0.36 0.09 0.87* 
ESI, EU 0.48 0.18 0.27+ -0.64* -0.29 -0.19+ 0.28 -0.10 0.15 0.02 -0.61+ 
M1 -0.25 -0.8*** -0.08 0.12 1.04 -0.02 0.52 -0.48* -0.22 -0.21 -0.37 
Country-level controls 
ESI 0.14+ 0.20* 0.03 0.02 0.06 0.00 -- 0.19* -0.00 0.12+ -0.07 
Industrial 
production 
-0.03 -- 0.12 -0.19+ -0.21+ -0.02 -0.01 -0.36** 0.06 -- -- 
Unemployment  0.01 0.02 -0.03* -0.01 -0.03 -0.00 -0.03** -0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.01 
Inflation -0.19 0.07 0.03 -0.26 0.76 0.39+ 0.26 -0.12 0.01 -0.40+ -1.6** 
High negative                                                                     Neutral                                                                    High positive 
 
 
Significance levels: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1% 
Notes: for the correct inference of estimated dummy variables parameters, we estimate the system without robust 
correction of the corresponding standard errors. To distinguish between highly insignificant parameter estimates and 
estimates for which t-ratios are higher than 1, we denote the corresponding estimated parameters with + that corresponds 
to 32% significance level. The dummy for Slovakia coincides with the global financial crisis, hence the euro 
corresponding events and crisis event could not be separated. For controls with many missing observations, parameters 




Table 5: Founding members’ market reaction to euro adoption announcement and the euro adoption 
event, conditional variance equation 
Country AT BE DE   ES   FI   FR  IE   IT   LU   NL  PT   
Panel A: euro announcement events 
D1news -6.30 -1.38 0.27 4.89+ 0.98 -0.05 -3.05     -0.57 2.86 
D2news 1.71 0.78 0.61 1.13 1.05 0.58* 10.66+     -0.99 8.47* 
Dnews.gr -2.67 0.45 -0.02 -0.41 0.44 -0.13 -0.03 -1.04 2.88 -1.89 -2.58 
Dnews.si -9.89+ -3.64** -1.47+ -1.88 -5.19 -0.28 -7.8*** -2.03 -8.58* -3.99** -2.34 
Dnews.mt.cy -7.87 -1.83 0.05 -0.82 6.67 -0.01 13.49 0.09 -5.54 2.32 1.98 
Dnews.sk 37.67 1.49 -0.13 0.78 2.93 0.91 25.17+ -2.04 31.43* 9.72 3.75 
Dnews.ee -10.26+ -4.20** 1.79+ 4.27 -1.88 -0.45 -0.70 -2.08 -8.17 -0.16 -0.57 
Dnews.lv -11.89** -2.22 -0.41 -4.60** -5.20 0.34 -2.55 -0.52 -7.01 -3.75*** -4.74 
Dnews.lt -8.45 -3.50+ -0.32 -2.15 -4.27** -0.52 -10.02 -2.17 -7.16 -2.81*** -0.17 
Panel B: euro introduction events 
Deuro 6.58 2.16 -0.10 0.06 1.35 -0.25 3.60 1.40   -0.58 1.04 
Deuro.gr 31.42+ 13.77+ -0.10 -2.42 4.37 -0.33 1.41 -1.32 4.69 2.44 -1.90 
Deuro.si -8.87+ -2.74+ -1.30** 5.11+ -3.40 -0.84** 3.16 -4.26** -6.92* -1.27 -8.70* 
Deuro.mt.cy 10.84 2.33 0.49 -1.87 6.84 0.12 4.47 0.25 12.37 2.99 -3.69 
Deuro.sk -0.09 -3.18 0.14 -0.78 0.28 0.78 0.34 1.87 -4.04 -0.16 -7.84* 
Deuro.ee -10.69* -1.47 -0.16 -3.35 2.22 0.74* -8.24 0.93 -7.83** 0.45 -10.4** 
Deuro.lv -12.92+ -1.53 -0.46 -2.99* -5.42+ -0.10 13.55 -0.25 -8.70** -2.34** 6.31 
Deuro.lt 6.48 -2.90* -0.20+ -4.18* -1.74 -0.44 -4.13 -1.82 -6.36 -1.77 -2.99 
Panel C: conditional variance variables 
Constant 8.16* 2.30*** 0.11 0.88 0.65 0.08 0.82 0.44 2.64*** 0.68** 0.91 
γ 0.98+ 1.37**                   
α 0.04 0.15** 0.04+ 0.11** 0.09** 0.04 0.05 0.10* 0.27*** 0.04 0.00 
β 0.41* 0.58*** 0.92*** 0.81*** 0.87*** 0.89*** 0.86*** 0.86*** 0.63*** 0.83*** 0.93*** 
Model GJR TARCH GARCH 
TS- 







High negative                                                                        Neutral                                                                   High positive 
 
 
Significance levels: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1% 
Notes: The model parameters in Panel A include asymmetry effects (γ), GARCH effects (β) and ARCH effects (α). See 




Table 6: Non-Founding members’ market reaction to euro adoption announcement and the euro 
adoption event, conditional mean equation  
Country GR   SI   CY   MT   EE   LV   LT 
Panel A: euro announcement events 
Dnews.gr -13.69*       
Dnews.si 1.01 -3.80      
Dnews.mt.cy 2.03 -8.18+ 0.61 -3.88    
Dnews.sk -2.11 2.07 13.87+ -5.92+    
Dnews.ee 6.28 -3.93 -3.76 -3.01 3.90   
Dnews.lv 4.74 -- -7.99 -2.08 -6.38 -4.22  
Dnews.lt -1.10 -- 6.19 0.87 -2.02 -3.14 -0.11 
Panel B: euro introduction events 
Deuro.gr -3.83       
Deuro.si 6.42 14.11***      
Deuro.mt.cy -2.67 -8.18+ 1.04 -1.20    
Deuro.sk -2.11 8.92+ 11.87 -3.33    
Deuro.ee 5.08 -- 10.08 0.63 -0.06   
Deuro.lv 0.56 -- -0.20 -2.58 -2.29 4.86  
Deuro.lt -18.6*** -- -16.40+ -1.55 4.93 1.52 -1.47 
Panel C: control variables 
Constant 0.15 0.13 -1.66 0.41 0.87 1.06 0.75 
Market spillover 0.97*** 0.09 1.29*** 0.18*** 0.41*** 0.22** 0.27*** 
ESI, EA -1.61* -0.62 -2.22+ -0.07 -0.07 0.70 0.21 
ESI, EU 1.61* 1.33* 3.35* 0.39 0.72 -0.15 0.93+ 
M1 -0.51 0.06 -0.38 0.48 0.37 0.11 0.32 
Country-level controls 
ESI 0.51** 0.25* 0.02 0.06 0.55** 0.54* 0.17 
Industrial 
production -0.32* 0.26+ 0.88+ -0.09 0.52*** 0.24+ 0.11+ 
Unemployment  -0.04** -0.04+ -0.07+ -0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.02+ 
Inflation -0.76* 0.77 -0.54 -0.28 -1.04 -1.27+ -0.48 
High negative                                                       Neutral                                                                         High positive 
 
 
Significance levels: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1% 






Table 7: Non-Founding members’ market reaction to euro adoption announcement and the euro 
adoption event, conditional variance equation 
Country GR   SI   CY   MT   EE LV   LT   
Panel A: euro announcement events 
Dnews.gr 0.67           
Dnews.si -3.06 -13.83***         
Dnews.mt.cy -1.74 22.09 -27.69 -10.76***     
Dnews.sk 3.43 27.58 -15.91 -0.74     
Dnews.ee -0.81 0.16 -59.36+ -5.44 -9.25   
Dnews.lv -0.58  -- -1.80 -7.10* -15.34+ -23.39  
Dnews.lt 1.20 -- 14.73 -1.96 -19.98** -32.26*** -11.03* 
Panel B: euro introduction events 
Deuro.gr -0.83            
Deuro.si -2.54 16.23         
Deuro.mt.cy 0.13 33.22+ -35.52 -5.89*     
Deuro.sk 0.03 -17.70** 75.96* 13.17     
Deuro.ee 0.17 -- -27.50 1.95 -13.66   
Deuro.lv -0.17 -- 47.96* -3.98 -14.71+ 23.51*   
Deuro.lt 0.80 -- -24.61* 14.42 -17.68* -17.38* -10.92* 
Panel C: conditional variance variables 
Constant 1.21 5.44* 46.88* 6.56*** 11.34 4.67 0.44 
 γ 0.09+   0.22+ -1.10+      
α 0.08 -0.06 0.20* 0.15+ 0.38*** 0.13** 0.12*** 
β 0.90*** 0.78*** 0.61*** 0.40** 0.38** 0.83*** 0.90*** 
Model TARCH 
TS-







High negative                                                        Neutral                                                                        High positive 
 
 
Significance levels: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1% 
Notes: see notes on Table 5. 
 
 
Figure 1: Stock Market Volatility in Slovenia and the euro area, 2006–2007 
 
Note: volatility is calculated as squared log daily returns. Authors calculations based on Bloomberg data.  
 
Figure 2: Stock Market Volatility in Lithuania and the euro area, 2014–2015 
 



































 Figure 3: Cumulative abnormal returns in founding euro members 
   
   












































































Figure 4:  Founding members’ heat map of abnormal returns to the first, second announcements of 
the euro introduction and the euro introduction events. 
i 
Trading days 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 
Panel A:  First announcement, 17.06.1997 
AT                                          
DE                                          
FI                                          
IE                                          
PT                                          
BE                                          
ES                                          
FR                                          
NE                                          
Panel B: Second announcement, 05.03.1998 
AT                                          
BE                                          
ES                                          
FI                                          
FR                                          
PT                                          
DE                                          
IE                                          
NE                                          
Panel C: Euro introduction event, 01.01.1999 
AT                                          
FI                                          
IE                                          
PT                                          
BE                                          
NE                                          
ES                                          
DE                                          
FR                                          
IT                                          
 High negative                                                                                     Neutral                                                                               High positive 
 
Notes: The heat map depicts abnormal daily returns (ARs), where darkest blue color represents the largest negative values, 
while dark red color the largest positive values of ARs for each corresponding panel. Neutral values represent close to 
zero ARs. The magnitude of ARs does not imply the statistical significance of deviations. Significant values are marked 




Figure 5: Cumulative abnormal returns in non-founding euro members 
   































































Figure 6: Non-Founding members’ heat map of abnormal returns with the euro adoption 
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Panel A:  Euro adoption announcement 
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SK                                            
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Panel B: Euro adoption event 
GR                                            
SI                                            
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MT                                            
SK                                            
EE                                            
LV                                            
LT                                            
Panel C: Failed to meet convergence criteria 
GR                                          
LT                                          
 High negative                                                                                     Neutral                                                                               High positive 
 
 









Country Euro introduction 












Euro adoption date, 
Deuro.CC 
AT Austria 17.06.1997 05.03.1998  01.01.1999 
BE Belgium 17.06.1997 05.03.1998  01.01.1999 
DE Germany 17.06.1997 05.03.1998  01.01.1999 
ES Spain 17.06.1997 05.03.1998  01.01.1999 
FI Finland 17.06.1997 05.03.1998  01.01.1999 
FR France 17.06.1997 05.03.1998  01.01.1999 
IE Ireland 17.06.1997 05.03.1998  01.01.1999 
IT Italy 17.06.1997 05.03.1998  01.01.1999 
LU Luxemburg 17.06.1997 05.03.1998  01.01.1999 
NE Netherlands 17.06.1997 05.03.1998  01.01.1999 
PT Portugal 17.06.1997 05.03.1998  01.01.1999 
GR Greece  05.03.1998* 20.06.2000 01.01.2001 
SI Slovenia   03.02.2006 01.01.2007 
MT Malta   16.05.2007 01.01.2008 
CY Cyprus   16.05.2007 01.01.2008 
SK Slovakia   05.07.2008 01.01.2009 
EE Estonia   07.03.2010 01.01.2011 
LV Latvia   07.09.2013 01.01.2014 
LT Lithuania  16.05.2006* 23.07.2014 01.01.2015 
Notes: * denotes the natural experiment events when Greece and Lithuania failed to meet the convergence criteria and 
enter the euro area in early years with founding members and Slovenia correspondingly.  
 
Appendix 2. Descriptive statistics, daily stock market returns. 
 
i Mean Median Minimum Maximum Std. Dev. Skewness Ex. kurtosis 
AT -0.0001 0.0010 -0.0870 0.0526 0.0131 -1.0055 5.2157 
BE 0.0010 0.0014 -0.0448 0.0445 0.0108 -0.1380 1.6869 
DE 0.0011 0.0024 -0.0838 0.0611 0.0157 -0.7546 3.0796 
ES 0.0013 0.0017 -0.0672 0.0573 0.0145 -0.5375 3.4616 
FI 0.0016 0.0030 -0.0859 0.0970 0.0168 -0.4523 4.5643 
FR 0.0011 0.0012 -0.0563 0.0610 0.0143 -0.2103 1.9921 
IE 0.0011 0.0015 -0.0757 0.0583 0.0111 -0.6399 7.0860 
IT 0.0014 0.0030 -0.0636 0.0699 0.0211 -0.1876 0.6666 
LU -0.0010 -0.0015 -0.0179 0.0120 0.0075 -0.1225 -0.3366 
NE 0.0011 0.0022 -0.0612 0.0573 0.0155 -0.3819 1.8605 
PT 0.0015 0.0016 -0.0959 0.0694 0.0138 -0.8879 7.9272 
GR -0.0005 -0.0014 -0.0962 0.0762 0.0211 0.1359 2.0605 
SI 0.0009 0.0004 -0.0635 0.0556 0.0090 -0.3267 7.8483 
MT -0.0004 -0.0003 -0.0297 0.0345 0.0067 0.0508 4.6162 
CY 0.0007 0.0006 -0.0885 0.0836 0.0171 -0.3182 3.8057 
SK -0.0032 0.0003 -0.3298 0.2843 0.0554 -0.7587 17.4090 
EE 0.0023 0.0014 -0.0575 0.1209 0.0154 1.3192 8.1301 
LV 0.0007 0.0005 -0.0358 0.0329 0.0079 -0.1724 1.4701 
LT 0.0003 0.0002 -0.0384 0.0291 0.0055 -0.6139 10.1050 
Notes: summary statistics are provided for samples, where event studies models were estimated, and vary from 1.5 to 2.5 
years depending on the country case. Negative values for skewness show that market returns below the median are 
typically larger in magnitude than above median. High values for excess kurtosis mean that outliers are more likely than 




Appendix 3. Descriptive statistics, monthly stock market returns. 
 
i Mean Median Minimum Maximum Std. Dev. Skewness Ex. kurtosis 
AT 0.3640 1.0430 -32.5940 13.5470 6.2709 -1.3110 4.2949 
BE 0.3437 1.0735 -24.0880 13.5140 5.0667 -1.3646 3.6102 
DE 0.6860 1.4967 -29.3330 19.3740 6.4787 -0.9347 2.7507 
ES 0.5494 0.9654 -21.5140 15.1910 5.9657 -0.5364 1.0458 
FI 0.7121 1.2344 -31.3220 25.7510 7.7692 -0.3363 2.0468 
FR 0.3968 1.2334 -19.2250 12.5880 5.5443 -0.6019 0.5755 
IE 0.4119 1.2670 -23.5820 17.8250 5.8565 -0.9685 2.0317 
IT -0.0253 0.4565 -18.3080 19.0890 6.4861 -0.2349 0.6804 
LU 0.2866 1.0579 -31.2050 16.6460 6.7946 -1.3198 4.4766 
NE 0.3313 1.2182 -22.6220 14.5690 5.9745 -1.0148 2.2119 
PT 0.1450 0.5363 -23.3480 17.1920 6.0838 -0.4948 1.3605 
GR -0.1060 0.2222 -32.6730 34.5950 9.5172 -0.1528 1.2152 
SI 0.4759 0.4487 -20.6910 28.4990 6.6009 0.0366 2.5628 
MT 0.5790 -0.0778 -10.8300 22.6780 4.9457 1.1539 3.1253 
CY -2.2187 -1.0982 -53.4420 38.0550 14.7600 -0.3360 1.0556 
SK -0.3921 -0.0557 -36.1010 22.6770 7.6009 -1.2778 7.2628 
EE 0.9862 1.1147 -44.9770 37.0330 9.8791 -0.6968 4.7779 
LV 0.7323 0.6294 -27.0750 29.2340 6.7212 -0.3394 4.3035 
LT 0.8654 0.9356 -35.0910 36.0760 7.2522 -0.4754 6.5816 
Notes: summary statistics are provided for the whole available data samples. Values for logarithmic returns are multiplied 
by factor 100, hence it could be interpreted as percentage changes. Negative values for skewness show that market returns 
below the median are typically larger in magnitude than above the median. High values for excess kurtosis mean that 
outliers are more likely than for normal distribution.  
 
Appendix 4. Descriptive statistics, monthly stock market volatility. 
 
i Mean Median Minimum Maximum Std. Dev. Skewness Ex. kurtosis 
AT 41.7910 12.8710 0.0000 901.1200 91.2860 5.2483 37.4290 
BE 39.1540 10.1950 0.0003 1086.2000 98.4490 7.1986 64.9380 
DE 25.5600 7.9046 0.0001 596.9000 60.6720 5.6954 40.7510 
ES 35.4350 9.6524 0.0002 486.8000 61.9760 3.4145 15.8810 
FI 60.0970 17.3860 0.0000 1026.2000 121.1600 4.0984 21.7180 
FR 30.6060 11.6380 0.0013 385.0300 49.2250 3.1924 13.8880 
IE 34.1500 11.0850 0.0041 575.7200 68.7200 4.1738 21.6700 
IT 41.8670 14.7650 0.0000 365.3400 68.7100 2.8116 8.2497 
LU 45.9280 11.7390 0.0001 991.6900 117.1900 5.8398 38.7060 
NE 35.5390 9.9070 0.0017 526.8400 73.0970 4.2732 21.6610 
PT 36.8510 12.7150 0.0007 551.9100 67.7020 3.9073 19.3220 
GR 90.1840 27.0310 0.0000 1204.1000 162.0600 3.7301 17.5370 
SI 43.3260 10.3770 0.0007 785.3000 92.8100 4.4919 26.0970 
MT 24.3540 6.3467 0.0000 488.3800 55.2560 5.5906 39.6710 
CY 216.1400 55.7580 0.0076 2623.8000 379.3200 3.3106 14.1600 
SK 57.1600 2.6180 0.0023 1275.1000 174.9000 4.8602 27.0510 
EE 97.1630 19.3900 0.0005 2112.6000 253.5200 4.9254 27.6710 
LV 44.9270 9.5811 0.0010 812.3400 113.1100 4.9381 27.4810 
LT 52.3050 10.7550 0.0000 1292.9000 153.6500 6.3459 44.4130 




Appendix 5. Financial openness in the euro area 
 
Existing studies of financial integration have largely focused on general measures of financial 
openness (Bekaert G. , et al., 2007); mostly due to the limited availability of the balance of payments 
data on the bilateral foreign direct investments. In order to ascertain if financial integration was a 
factor in the responses to euro introduction, we have fashioned a financial openness indicator, by 
taking the sum of absolute values of inward and outward financial flows and dividing it over the sum 











where 𝑎𝑖𝑡 denotes the assets of country 𝑖 at year 𝑡 (outward FDI flow), 𝑙𝑖𝑡 are stands for corresponding 
liabilities (inward FDI flow) and 𝑦𝑖𝑡 is the nominal GDP. The time average taken over 1999-2017 
allows us to smooth the impacts of both business and financial cycles and also accounts for the usage 
of financial flows instead of investment positions.  
The results of this exercise are shown in Figure A1, which clusters the countries of the euro area into 
three groups applying Ward's hierarchical agglomerative clustering method (Murtagh & Legendre, 
2014).  The small and open economies in the upper left and middle clusters are also likely to have 
high levels of financial openness; this could be positive, in that these countries will reap the benefits 
of cross-border investment, portfolio diversification, and foreign bank involvement, but it may also 
have negative consequences in terms of exposure to international conditions. By contrast, the medium 
and largest euro area economies in the lower right cluster appear capable of financing their economic 
activities utilizing domestic financial resources, being relatively more insulated. Most importantly, 
in line with the results presented in the main text, it appears that the most financially open countries 




Figure A1: Financial openness in the euro area, 1999-2017. 
 
 
Source: Eurostat, authors’ calculations.  



















































































































































































































































































































































































Appendix 6. Trade integration in the euro area 
 
It can be plausibly argued that real trade linkages, rather than financial channels, may condition a 
country’s response to the expansion of the euro. Measures of trade linkages differ across studies 
(Böwer & Guillemineau, 2006; Herrero & Ruiz, 2008), with early studies widely using trade 
openness, defined as the sum of total exports and imports of both countries, divided by the sum of 
national GDPs. In our paper, following Böwer and Guillemineau (2006) we instead fashion a trade-





𝑥𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝑚𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝑥𝑗𝑖𝑡 + 𝑚𝑗𝑖𝑡





where 𝑥𝑖𝑗𝑡 denotes the exports of country 𝑖 to country 𝑗 at year 𝑡, 𝑚𝑖𝑗𝑡 are stands for corresponding 
imports, 𝑥𝑖𝑡 and 𝑚𝑖𝑡 represent total exports and imports of country 𝑖. The time average taken over 
2000-2017 allows us to smooth the impacts of both business and financial cycles. Alternatively, 
similar to the financial openness indicator shown in the previous section, the scaling variable could 
be the sum of national GDPs, although we eschew this approach here. 
As with the financial openness indicator, the countries were clustered into three groups applying 
Ward's hierarchical agglomerative clustering method (Murtagh & Legendre, 2014). Figure A2 
reveals that intra-trade integration also shows three distinct clusters within the euro area: the most 
integrated countries, perhaps not surprisingly the original members of the EU, with smaller countries 
incredibly integrated; the Baltic countries, forming their own cluster and highly integrated with each 
other but not very integrated with the rest of the EA; and the rest of euro area members with no 
particular intra-trade concentration with other members. This third group is comprised generally of 
new members who have not had the same opportunities within the EU (i.e. due to a shorter lifespan) 





Figure A2: Trade integration in the euro area, 2000-2017. 
 
 
Source: Eurostat, authors’ calculations.  
Notes: The sample starts in 2000 due to the lack of intra EU and extra EU trade data in 1999.  
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